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Fossil Fuel Rents: Who Initiates International Crises? 
Zorzeta Bakaki  
Abstract 
Existing research suggests that both natural resource abundance and scarcity are likely to increase the risk 
of interstate and domestic conflict. Two crucial aspects, however, have largely been neglected in the 
existing literature: (1) the analysis of international crises (i.e., non-violent conflicts) and (2) the effects of 
different market conditions of energy resources. Especially a growing number of market participants can 
affect the strategic value of natural resources and, thus, the incentives for international crisis initiation. It 
is argued that different market structures make countries to adopt either aggressive or more peaceful 
behavior towards other states, and this is why I empirically then disaggregate fossil fuels along with the 
market that they belong to. This study examines 179 countries at the monadic level since 1980. The 
results suggest variation on the incentives of crisis initiation along the different fossil fuels, while I also 
correct for potential endogeneity issues. 
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Introduction 
Often literature employs the term “petro-aggression” to show that major oil exporters are more 
likely to engage in crises when oil prices are high (Friedman, 2009). In other words, oil rents 
reduce “the leader’s risk of domestic punishment for foreign policy adventurism” (Colgan, 2013: 
161) and thus, provide incentives to engage in international crises.  
Other literature suggests that the increasing globalization of energy markets (Goldthau and 
Witte, 2009) and the increasing competition in certain segments of oil production (Hughes and 
Long, 2015) has changed states’ behavior in the international system. These changing market 
conditions often decrease the incentive for foreign policy adventurism because consumers are 
able to substitute unreliable suppliers.  
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This study builds on the idea that market incentives matter (Månsson, 2014) by systematically 
analyzing whether fossil fuel exporters1 tend to engage more often in international crises. I 
extend the framework developed by Colgan (2013) within the framework of “producer politics”. 
I introduce a “rents-pacification” argument that suggests that fossil fuel exporters do not risk 
their fossil revenues in order to get engaged in a crisis.  
I examine the opportunity costs associated with assertive behavior of exporters across three 
market structures: (1) monopoly, (2) oligopoly and (3) free market. Based on the rates of fossil 
fuel rents and the market competition, gas represents a stylized example for a monopoly (very 
few competitors if not only one competitor) (Gordon et al., 2003; Saidu, 2008; Henderson and 
Pirani, 2014), oil for an oligopoly (a few competitors) (Cologni and Manera, 2014) and coal for a 
free market structure (many competitors) (Böhringer and Rutherford, 2002). Under conditions of 
monopoly, I expect the domination of a “petro-aggression” mechanism, because states have 
relatively low opportunity costs of initiating a crisis. Under conditions of oligopoly, it dominates 
a “rents-pacification” mechanism, as exporters have to face the possibility of consumers 
switching to other suppliers. Finally, under free market conditions, I expect that the opportunity 
costs of initiating a crisis are low since free market products are easily accessible and 
inexpensive.  
There is little systematic research and inclusive empirical findings, linking fossil fuels and 
international crises onset (Koubi et al., 2014; Sovacool, 2014; Bove et al., 2015). Apart from 
making a general contribution to this strand of research, this study: (1) systematically tests the 
probability of states’ crises initiation, (2) disaggregates fossil fuels according to different market 
structures and introduces the “rents-pacification” argument, and (3) solves the potential 
endogeneity bias, by proposing an instrumental variable.2 
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Energy fossil fuels’ rents of different economic markets have an impact on states’ choice of 
initiating a crisis. The type of the market that each product belongs to determines the direction of 
the outcome. That is, exporters of monopolistic and free market products appear with an 
aggressive policy behavior whilst exporters of other markets (oligopoly) consider potential loses 
of their revenues when triggering a crisis. 
Energy Resources and Paths to International Crisis  
A state initiates a crisis only if it expects more gains through crises rather than through other 
means (Bueno de Mesquita, 1980; Powell, 2006; Reiter, 2003; Wagner, 2000). The key to 
understanding the incentives of the energy rents countries is to think about the opportunity costs 
associated with different paths of crisis initiation. Along the same lines, trade might increase the 
opportunity costs of conflicts and thus lead to more peaceful relations (Oneal and Russett, 1999; 
Hegre et al., 2010). Nonetheless, under certain market conditions, (e.g., trade asymmetries) trade 
can also fuel conflicts (Barbieri, 1996; Garfinkel et al., 2008).  
To further our understanding of potential opportunity costs that fossil-fuel countries have to face 
when initiating an international crisis, I relate the opportunity costs to different market structures. 
I classify the market conditions by the number of competitors in the market: (1) monopoly (one 
dominant exporter), (2) oligopoly (a few dominant exporters) and (3) free market (many 
exporters). I base my theoretical argument on the presumption that there are always many 
consumers in the market, and I develop the following three scenarios. 
In an oligopolistic market (oil rents) the major exporter is uncertain about the opportunity costs 
of initiating a crisis against another state, as the clients might still have a few alternative oil 
exporters. In this scenario the consumer states can interpret initiation of an international crisis as 
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a threat to their supplies and can decide to switch to another exporter. If a major consumer or 
many consumers switch to another supplier, it means a significant loss of revenues for the 
exporter. Consequently, under these market conditions the major exporters might prefer to keep 
political stability in order to protect their revenues. Thus, in this case instead of petro-aggression, 
I expect the dominance of a rents-pacification behavior. 
In a monopolistic market (gas rents) a major exporter has relatively low opportunity costs of 
initiating a crisis against another state, as there is not alternative exporter in the market. The 
exporter state can assume that other consumers do not have a credible alternative and the 
prospect of switching to another exporter and thus, the revenues will not be affected by the 
country’s aggressive foreign policy behavior. Additionally, given the strategic value of energy 
(Yergin, 2011), the dominance in the energy market might be easily transposed into political or 
military power preponderance, thus creating more incentives to initiate an international crisis. 
In a free market (coal rents) a major exporter takes smaller share of the market and thus 
generally smaller revenues as compared to monopolistic or oligopolistic markets.3 Smaller 
revenues are then associated with lower opportunity costs when initiating a crisis. In a free 
market where many states cover their needs for coal by their own domestic production, losing a 
few consumers who do not approve of a potential aggressive foreign policy behavior might not 
hurt economically the exporter state. Hence, under free market conditions exporters will be less 
concerned about their reputational damage among the consumers, and will, therefore, initiate 
more international crises. 
Based on the aforementioned considerations I propose the following hypotheses: 
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H1: Countries with high oil rents do not initiate international crises (oligopolistic market 
conditions). 
H2: Countries with high gas rents initiate international crises (monopolistic market conditions). 
H3: Countries with high coal rents initiate international crises (free market conditions). 
Methodological approach 
For this analysis I employ the actor level data of the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project 
for 179 countries from 1980 to 2006. A recent crisis in the dataset is the regime change in Iraq, 
which was triggered by the US in 2002 with the involvement of the United Kingdom (UK). The 
year 2002 is thus coded as a crisis year for Iraq, USA and UK. Meanwhile, 2003 is not a crisis 
year in the dataset as the crisis was escalated to war. Although a dyadic level of analysis would 
account for the relations of pairs of states in the market, the ultimate goal of this study is to 
examine whether there is a difference across the type and the quantity of the energy goods that 
countries export and their incentives to initiate an international crisis.  
Crisis initiation 
Existing literature indicates that the relation between interstate crises and energy natural 
resources remains rarely analyzed (Koubi et al., 2012). Due to the decrease of international 
armed conflict (Gleditsch and Pickering, 2014), I examine the impact of energy resources in 
international crises and move beyond an examination of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) 
data (Ghosn et al., 2004). The dependent variable, crisis initiation, indicates the trigger of a crisis 
by a state actor in a specific year4. It is a binary variable that is coded 1 for crisis initiation (0 
otherwise). I use the monadic version of the International Crisis Behavior dataset (ICB) (Brecher 
and Wilkenfeld, 2010).  
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Fossil fuel rents 
Smith (forthcoming) proposes a measurement of “rent leverage” computed by dividing fuel 
income per capita with the purchasing power parity (PPP)-corrected GDP per capita. In other 
words, the measure employed by Smith is highly linked to the average citizen’s livelihood. This, 
in turn, can impact on domestic political stability. While this measure might indeed be 
appropriate for the analysis of domestic mechanisms that lead to political instability and 
domestic conflict, for the purposes of this study, I opt for a simple measure that only refers to the 
revenues made by fossil fuels. That is, I measure fossil fuel rents as the percentage of GDP that 
is in GDP 2005 prices. Ultimately, this measure focuses on state capacity per se that could 
potentially have some impact on international crises. The theoretical framework suggests that 
certain market conditions have a restrictive effect on aggressive foreign policy behavior, 
regardless whether rents are used to boost patronage or not. Thus, I employ the World Bank’s 
indicators for oil, gas and coal, which are estimated through the difference between the values of 
production at world prices and total costs of production (The World Bank indicators, 2015).  
Instrumental variable 
Endogeneity is a major methodological problem in the study of the relationship between natural 
resources and crises (Ross, 2006; Lujala, 2009; Brunnschweiller and Bulte, 2009, Koubi et al., 
2012; Mitchell and Thies, 2012). Economic and political factors that are meant to explain the 
dependent variable of interest (crisis initiation) are likely to affect the main explanatory variables 
(fossil fuels) as well. In order to address this endogeneity problem, this study employs an 
instrumental model approach.  
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A valid instrument is a variable that is correlated with the key independent variable, but at the 
same time it should be uncorrelated with the error term. In turn, this can resolve the problems 
that measurement error, omitted variable bias, and simultaneous causation create – “endogeneity 
bias” (Ramsay, 2011). That is, an instrumental variable replaces the problematic independent 
variable with a substitution variable that is uncontaminated by error or unobserved factors that 
affect the outcome.  The literature offers a series of instruments aiming to solve potential 
endogeneity bias in the study of natural resources5.  
For the purposes of this analysis, I employ the terrain quality as an instrument. Two major 
conditions have to be satisfied for an instrument to provide consistent parameter estimates: (1) 
the instrument has to be exogenous to international crisis initiation (dependent variable) and (2) 
it has to be related to changes in fossil fuel rents (core explanatory items).  
Arguing that terrain quality does not affect the probability of crisis initiation satisfies the first 
condition. Civil war research indicates that terrain quality is a factor influencing intrastate 
conflict, because it allows rebels to hide from the stronger government forces, thus addressing 
the power asymmetry between state and non-state actors (Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). That said, there is no obvious argument for why 
terrain quality should affect the likelihood of international crisis initiation. To be clear: while 
there are arguments linking domestic conflict, and its underlying processes, with the outbreak of 
interstate disputes (Salehyan, 2008), none of the arguments in the literature refers to terrain 
quality. Hence, I can consider the variable on terrain quality as an exogenous factor and, in fact, 
an unrelated determinant of international crisis. 
Regarding the second condition, the terrain quality must be related to the fossil fuels (oil, gas and 
coal). To this end, I consider a basic parameter of fossil fuel rents, i.e., the method of 
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transportation as a link between our instrument and fossil fuel rents. I expect that the less 
difficult the transportation of a product, the higher the rents that it may generate. Oil, gas, and 
coal are mostly transported using trucks, trains, and pipelines. Transportation is fairly easy and 
cheap when a country’s terrain is approachable. Pipelines, for instance, are considered the safest 
method of fuels’ transportation. Pipelines are located away from the woods and forested areas. 
However, rough or mountainous terrain might constitute a problem for the construction of 
pipelines; it might be either not feasible to construct a pipeline at all or too expensive. For the 
aforementioned reasons, terrain quality is likely to be strongly associated with fossil fuel rents.  
Table 1 summarizes the measurement and sources for all variables included in the analysis and 
Table 2 illustrates descriptive statistics of all variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Concept Specification and Operationalization 
Variable name                          Measurement 
International crisis 
initiation 
Coded as 1 if state has triggered (trigger entity variable) at least one 
international crisis per year (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2010). 
Oil Rents Oil rents as a share of GDP (constant 2005 prices). Measured as the 
difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices 
and total costs of production. Available through: World 
Development Indicators. 
Gas Rents Gas rents as a share of GDP (constant 2005 prices). Measured as the 
difference between the value of crude gas production at world prices 
and total costs of production. Available through: World 
Development Indicators.  
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Coal Rents Coal rents as a share of GDP (constant 2005 prices). Measured as the 
difference between the value of coal production at world prices and 
total costs of production. Available through: World Development 
Indicators.  
Military strength  Military Personnel adjusted by population. Data taken from the 
Correlates of War (COW) project.  
Military expenses A natural logarithm of countries’ military expenditures transformed 
in thousands of constant 2005 US Dollars. Data taken from the 
Correlates of War (COW) project and DiGiuseppe, 2015. 
Openness Openness is calculated by the sum of imports and exports divided by 
GDP (Gleditsch, 2002). 
GDP per capita The natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2005 prices 
(Gleditsch, 2002).  
Democracy Polity2 measure ranges from -10 to 10. Data from the Polity IV 
project (Marshall et al., 2010).  
Borders Total number of borders. Data from the COW project site (Stinnett et 
al., 2002). 
IGO The total number of IGO memberships per year. Data from the COW 
project site (Pevehouse et al., 2004). 
Terrain quality 
(Instrument) 
The terrain quality is measured by the estimated percentage of 
mountainous terrain and using data from Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
International crisis initiation 4,698 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Oil rents (lag) 3,954 4.30 10.67 0.00 78.93 
Gas rents (lag) 4,275 0.73 3.26 0.00 64.90 
Coal rents (lag) 4,327 0.05 0.30 0.00 6.85 
GDP ln  (lag) 4,280 8.35 1.18 4.90 11.52 
Democracy (lag) 3,643 1.50 7.34 -10 10 
Borders 4,324 5.81 3.40 0 29 
Military Strength (lag) 4,238 0.01 0.01 0 0.08 
Military expenses ln (lag) 3,533 12.70 4.88 -6.68 20.02 
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Openness (lag) 4,267 4.61 12.30 -0.02 305.20 
IGO (lag) 4,151 55.07 21.69 1 129 
Quality of terrain (instrumental 
variable) 
3,923 3.06 2.49 0 6 
 
Empirical analysis 
I first present probit models (Tables 3-5) that examine a direct relationship between crisis 
initiation and fossil fuels. I, however, expect that the results obtained through probit estimations 
be biased because fossil fuel exports are endogenous to international crises (Ross, 2006; Lujala, 
2009; Brunnschweiller and Bulte, 2009, Koubi et al., 2012). To obtain robust results I apply an 
instrumental variable approach (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Ramsay, 2011) and compute 
probit models with endogenous regressors (ivprobit). Thus, I proceed with the analysis of the 
instrumental models (Tables 3-5) and I present second stage results for ivprobit. Considering the 
structure of the instrumental model, I employ a test that examines the magnitude of the 
endogenous coefficients’ effect (oil, gas and coal rents). Hence, I implement a robust 
postestimation test for instrumental models provided by Mikusheva and Poi (2006; see also 
Finlay and Magnusson, 2009). This robust-instrumental variable test (“rivtest”) examines 
whether the coefficient of an endogenous variable (oil, gas and coal rents) is different from 0 
(null hypothesis). For the instrumental-variable probit, the rivtest calculates the minimum 
distance version of the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test statistic (a joint test of the structural 
parameter) and it presents the Wald test. A statistically significant value for both measures 
suggests that the coefficient of the endogenous variable is different from 0, which provides 
strong evidence in turn that the instrument is suitable. Inconsistent results across the two 
measures (AR and Wald) may – but do not have necessarily – point to weak instrument, as the 
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Wald test can be unsuitable for weak instruments (not the AR test, though). The AR test is a 
more conservative statistic.   
When examining the impact of oil and coal rents on crisis initiation, both measures (AR and 
Wald) are significant. This indicates that the results presented in the instrumental models (Table 
3 and 5) are robust. Coming to the impact of gas on crisis initiation, the AR and Wald tests are 
not consistently significant, which may affect – but not necessarily – the robustness of the results 
of the IV model presented in Table 4. To provide further evidence that the terrain quality 
indicator is indeed an exogenous item, I also provide a reduced form model (Table 6) that 
examines directly the relationship between the dependent variable of interest (crisis initiation) 
and the instrumental variable (terrain quality). The results show that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the two measures. That is, I am confident that in the IV-probit 
regression, I can employ the terrain quality for oil, gas and coal rents as an instrument in the 
selection equation. 
Model 2 in Table 3 shows that countries with oil rents are statistically significant associated with 
crisis initiation. The probability of crisis initiation decreases with oil rents. I also calculated 
substantive effects in the form of predicted probabilities. When examining these, the probability 
of crisis initiation is around 15% for the minimum value of oil rents; conversely, the risk of 
triggering a crisis drops by 5%-points, when moving to the maximum of the oil rents item. These 
findings are in line with the theoretical argument above: states with insignificant revenues might 
trigger a crisis. The underlying assumption is that countries with insignificant revenues might 
trigger a crisis in order to challenge the stability of the energy market.  
With regard to gas rents (Table 4), I find that states having a monopoly are more likely to initiate 
a crisis, knowing that there is unlikely to be much damage to their fuel revenues (Model 2). 
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Indeed, the substantive effect of gas rents emphasizes that the maximum value of gas rents is 
associated with a conflict initiation risk of 37%. 
Rents from a free market product, such as coal (Table 5), increase the probability of crisis 
initiation, as the damage of the revenues would be smaller (Model 2). The substantive effects 
indicate that states with high coal revenues (maximum value of that variable) have a probability 
of about 90% to initiate a crisis (holding all other variables constant at their means), while states 
characterized by the lowest value of coal revenues have risk of triggering a crisis of around 75%. 
Coming to the control variables, the results show that GDP per capita affects the risk of crisis 
initiation differently across markets. That is, wealthier countries are less likely to initiate a crisis 
in the model that focuses on gas. The results suggest that the impact of GDP per capita might 
differ as soon as we consider the impact of oil and coal rents that, however, mirrors much of the 
earlier research.  
Moreover, countries’ military capabilities and military expenses positively affect crisis initiation 
almost consistently across the models. For instance, the average elasticity of military capabilities 
across all models is 0.14. The average elasticity of military expenses across all models is 0.70. 
Similarly, more memberships in international organizations are associated with a higher 
likelihood of crisis initiation (in the models on gas and coal rents), which mirrors the underlying 
rationale of states being more involved in international affairs to be involved in more low-
intensity conflict. That said, when examining the effect of oil rents, states with fewer 
memberships are more likely to initiate crisis.   
Furthermore, I find that openness is a significantly positive indicator of crisis initiation in the 
model on coal while it has significantly negative impact on crisis initiation in the model on gas 
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rents. Nevertheless, openness is not statistically significant to crisis intuition in the model on oil 
rents. Shared borders are usually associated with a better opportunity for crisis (oil rents), and I 
find some evidence for this albeit not consistently across the different estimations. The findings, 
finally, highlight that democracies seem to be prone to crisis initiation (gas rents). The 
democracy effect is statistically insignificant in the models on oil and coal rents.  
The overall results illustrate what are the actors that are likely to trigger a crisis based on the 
fossil fuel product they produce and thus make income. In an attempt to examine the different 
market structures of fossil fuels with regards to crisis initiation, the results indicate that free 
markets and monopolies have a higher probability of triggering a crisis due to the low associated 
opportunity costs with energy revenues. In essence, these markets are placed at the extremes of 
the market structure. A monopoly (gas) faces little competition issues, if not at all (see also 
Gordon et al., 2003; Saidu, 2008; Henderson and Pirani, 2014). Strictly speaking, a monopoly 
consists of only one producer. However, the general development of fossil fuel production 
allows few countries to produce small quantities of gas as well (e.g., Italy, Denmark) (Glachant 
et al., 2013). And this is precisely the reason why gas can be referred to a “clumsy” monopoly. 
This is similar to the case of oil that few decades ago belonged to a “clumsy” monopoly, before 
it switched to an oligopoly market (Adelman, 2004). Yet, when only one state is the major 
exporter of a fossil fuel (i.e., gas), we still refer to a monopoly. Although, a free market (coal) is 
usually very competitive, the reality that there are many producers makes the product less 
desirable and as a result of a lower importance for a country’s revenues. On the contrary, a 
country of an oligopolistic product (oil) deals with a lot of uncertainty due to the amount of 
producers and the excessive need for the product. Therefore, the revenues from an oligopolistic 
market product are not stable and often very subtle to the market’s fluctuations. This makes 
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countries that rely on oil revenues more careful and rather risk averse towards their relations with 
other states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Crisis initiation: effects of oil rents (oligopolistic market) (1980-2006) 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) 
 Probit IV Probit 
Oil rents (lag) 0.00 -0.07** 
 (0.00) (0.02) 
   
GDP ln  (lag) -0.14** 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.11) 
 
Democracy (lag) 
 
0.02* 
 
-0.03 
 (0.00) (0.02) 
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Borders 0.01 0.05* 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
 
Military strength (lag) 
 
16.39** 
 
10.11 
 (6.48) (6.60) 
Military expenses ln (lag) 0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.14** 
(0.02) 
   
Openness (lag) 0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
 
IGO (lag) 
 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
   
t -0.12* -0.10* 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
   
t2 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
   
t3 -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
   
Constant -1.18** -2.77** 
 (0.44) (0.47) 
N 3,036 2,783 
Pseudo R2 0.16  
Wald Chi2 
 
150.68** 
 
295.27** 
 
Notes: All explanatory variables except the borders are lagged by one year. 
Standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Crisis initiation: effects of gas rents (monopolistic market) (1980-2006) 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) 
 Probit IV Probit 
Gas rents (lag) -0.05 0.25** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   
GDP ln  (lag) -0.16** -0.10** 
 (0.06) (0.02) 
 
Democracy (lag) 
 
0.02* 
 
0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
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Borders 0.02 -0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.00) 
 
Military strength (lag) 
 
17.27** 
 
21.51** 
 (6.58) (4.73) 
 
Military expenses ln (lag) 0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
 
Openness (lag) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.01** 
(0.01) 
 
IGO (lag) 
 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
   
t -0.11* -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.04) 
   
t2 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
   
t3 -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
   
Constant 1.18** 1.04* 
 (0.45) (0.50) 
N 3,014 2,776 
Pseudo R2 0.16  
Wald Chi2 144.91** 
 
648.19** 
 
Notes: All explanatory variables except the borders are lagged by one year. 
Standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
Table 5: Crisis initiation: effects of coal rents (competitive market) (1980-2006) 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) 
 Probit IV Probit 
Coal rents (lag) 0.18 3.07** 
 (0.10) (0.16) 
   
GDP ln  (lag) -0.16** -0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
 
Democracy (lag) 
 
0.02* 
 
-0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
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Borders 0.01 -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
 
Military strength (lag) 
 
20.09** 
(6.56) 
 
21.67** 
(5.04) 
 
Military expenses ln (lag) 
 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
 
-0.07 
(0.04) 
 
Openness 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
 
IGO (lag) 
 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
 
0.02** 
(0.00) 
   
t -0.11* 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
   
t2 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
   
t3 -0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
   
Constant -1.02** -0.17 
 (0.44) (0.36) 
N 3,021 2,783 
Pseudo R2 0.16  
Wald Chi2 
 
145.11** 3356.89** 
Notes: All explanatory variables except the borders are lagged by one year. 
Standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Crisis initiation and terrain quality (reduced form model) (1980-2006) 
 (Model 1) 
 Probit 
Quality of the terrain 0.07 
 (0.04) 
GDP ln  (lag) -0.20** 
 (0.06) 
Democracy (lag)    0.02* 
 (0.00) 
Borders 0.00 
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 (0.00) 
Military strength (lag)   17.84** 
 (6.40) 
Military expenses ln (lag) 0.12** 
(0.03) 
Openness (lag) 0.00 
(0.00) 
IGO (lag)   -0.00 
(0.00) 
t -0.13** 
 (0.05) 
t2 0.00 
 (0.00) 
t3 -0.00 
(0.00) 
Constant -1.53** 
 (0.46) 
N 2,872 
Pseudo R2 0.18 
Wald Chi2 169.18** 
 
Notes: All explanatory variables except the quality of terrain and borders are lagged by one 
year. Standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Previous studies have considered different types of resources as influential to conflict (i.e., oil 
and diamonds) (Ross, 2006). With a few exceptions (Goenner, 2010) the different levels of 
competition across the major energy markets have not been explicitly addressed by the existing 
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literature. For this reason I have disaggregated the energy resources according to the level of 
competition in the markets, and examined the association with crisis initiation.   
The results indicate that countries with oil rents acknowledge the instability of the oligopolistic 
market that oil belongs to, and they choose a pacifier’s behavior in their relations with other 
states. Countries with rents from monopolistic and free markets products -although very different 
structures- behave similarly with a positive relationship to crisis initiation. The features of the 
markets allow the actors to adopt aggressive behavior, given that their energy revenues are not 
affected, either because there is no competition (gas) or because the very high levels of 
competition (coal) generate small benefits. The major assumption behind this link is that actors 
before initiating a crisis calculate the potential damage. In these markets the damage of the fuels 
revenues is ultimately small because there are no many alternative gas exporters in the market 
and because there is very little need for coal imports. Therefore, “the resource backed 
aggression” (Colgan, 2010) is reversed to “market restricted behavior” and thus, pacifier’s 
behavior for fossil-fuel states of an oligopolistic market (i.e., oil).  
A prominent example of a major monopoly as a gas supplier is Russia. That said, the Russian 
market share as the dominant gas supplier has been declining since 1997 and overall the market 
has been exhibiting an increasing competition. Therefore, the expectation is to see a decline in 
crisis initiation also by the major gas exporters in the future due to the change of the market 
structure.  
In general, the study of states’ relations over fossil fuels is related to the literature on the 
pacifying effects of trade between states (e.g., Reuveny and Kang, 1998; Polachek et al., 1999). 
For example, research generally shows that trade ties between states improve their bilateral 
relations (Oneal and Russett, 1999; Barbieri, 1996), although more disaggregated work (e.g., 
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Dorussen, 2006) emphasizes that the composition of trade flows (i.e., “what you trade”) 
ultimately influences whether we see a pacifying or conflictive effect. Specifically, these latter 
studies find that there is variation across the types of commodities as they are “not uniform in 
their characteristics and can vary significantly in terms of their substitutability” (Goenner, 2010, 
p. 550). 
The present study examined the impact of oil rents on crisis initiation; yet, it is still worth 
examining whether governments also consider anticipated fossil fuel rents before initiating a 
crisis. That is, such a research question can be examined with prediction and forecasting 
techniques. In addition, while natural energy resources remain an important factor of states’ 
behavior and relations, renewable energy resources might change the scenarios by increasing 
market competition and therefore, the interests of major exporters and consumers respectively.
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Appendix 
 
Table Yes: List of countries included in the sample (1980-2006) 
 
Country 
International 
crisis 
initiation 
 
Afghanistan No 
Albania No 
Algeria No 
Angola Yes 
Antigua and Barbuda No 
Argentina Yes 
Armenia Yes 
Australia No 
Austria No 
Azerbaijan Yes 
Bahamas No 
Bangladesh No 
Barbados No 
Belarus No 
Belgium No 
Belize No 
Benin No 
Bhutan No 
Bolivia No 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Yes 
Botswana No 
Brazil No 
Bulgaria No 
Burkina Faso Yes 
Burundi No 
Cambodia No 
Cameroon Yes 
Canada No 
Cape Verde No 
Central African Republic No 
Chad Yes 
Chile No 
China Yes 
Colombia Yes 
Comoros No 
Congo No 
Costa Rica No 
Cote d'Ivoire No 
Cuba No 
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Cyprus Yes 
Czech Republic No 
Denmark No 
Djibouti No 
Dominica No 
Dominican Republic No 
Ecuador Yes 
Egypt Yes 
El Salvador No 
Estonia No 
Ethiopia Yes 
Fiji No 
Finland No 
France Yes 
Gabon No 
Gambia Yes 
Georgia Yes 
Germany No 
Ghana No 
Greece Yes 
Grenada Yes 
Guatemala No 
Guinea No 
Guyana Yes 
Haiti No 
Honduras Yes 
Hungary No 
India Yes 
Indonesia No 
Iran Yes 
Iraq Yes 
Ireland No 
Israel Yes 
Italy No 
Jamaica No 
Japan No 
Jordan No 
Kazakhstan No 
Kenya Yes 
Kiribati No 
Kuwait No 
Kyrgyz Republic No 
Laos Yes 
Latvia No 
Lebanon No 
Lesotho No 
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Liberia No 
Libya Yes 
Lithuania No 
Luxembourg No 
Macedonia No 
Madagascar No 
Malawi No 
Malaysia No 
Maldives No 
Mali Yes 
Marshall Islands No 
Mauritania Yes 
Mauritius No 
Mexico No 
Micronesia No 
Moldova No 
Mongolia No 
Morocco Yes 
Mozambique Yes 
Myanmar Yes 
Namibia No 
Nepal No 
Netherlands No 
New Zealand No 
Nicaragua Yes 
Niger No 
Nigeria Yes 
North Korea Yes 
Norway No 
Oman No 
Pakistan Yes 
Palau No 
Panama Yes 
Papua New Guinea Yes 
Paraguay No 
Peru Yes 
Poland No 
Portugal No 
Puerto Rico No 
Qatar Yes 
Russia Yes 
Rwanda Yes 
Saint Kitts and Nevis No 
Saint Lucia No 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines No 
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Samoa No 
Saudi Arabia Yes 
Senegal Yes 
Seychelles No 
Sierra Leone No 
Slovak Republic No 
Slovenia No 
Solomon Islands Yes 
Somalia Yes 
South Africa Yes 
South Korea Yes 
Spain Yes 
Sri Lanka Yes 
Sudan Yes 
Suriname No 
Swaziland No 
Sweden Yes 
Switzerland No 
Syria Yes 
Taiwan No 
Tajikistan No 
Tanzania No 
Thailand Yes 
Togo Yes 
Tonga No 
Trinidad and Tobago No 
Tunisia No 
Turkey Yes 
Turkmenistan No 
Tuvalu No 
Uganda Yes 
Ukraine No 
United Arab Emirates No 
United Kingdom Yes 
United States Yes 
Uruguay No 
Uzbekistan No 
Vanuatu No 
Venezuela Yes 
Vietnam Yes 
Yemen No 
Yugoslavia Yes 
Zambia No 
Zimbabwe Yes 
 
